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From Santa Barbara to Macondo to SEMS
David M. Hunter
Kara McQueen-Borden*
INTRODUCTION
Failures of safety and environmental systems contributed to the
blowout and explosion of the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico on
April 20, 2010, causing the largest oil spill in United States history.1
Accordingly, safety and environmental management systems (SEMS)
have been a focus of the broad regulatory responses to the Macondo
event.2 The Department of the Interior (DOI) defines a SEMS program
as “a comprehensive system to reduce human error and organizational
failure” and explains that the intent of its SEMS program is “to focus
attention on the role of human error and poor organization in accidents,
drive continuous improvement in the offshore industry’s safety and
environmental records, encourage the use of performance-based
operating practices, and encourage [industry collaboration] to promote
the interests of offshore worker safety and environmental protection.”3
In Part I, this article traces the development of the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) regulatory regime through oil spills and other events that
have inspired regulatory responses. In Part II, this article focuses on the
SEMS regulations promulgated since the Macondo event. The article
compares the predominantly regulatory response to the Macondo event
with the predominantly legislative responses to earlier oil spills, all to
identify the role of the SEMS regulations in the OCS regulatory scheme
that is developing post Macondo.

Copyright 2016, by DAVID M. HUNTER & KARA MCQUEEN-BORDEN.
 David M. Hunter is a partner and Kara McQueen-Borden is an associate of
Jones Walker LLP. Both practice energy, environmental, and natural resources law in
the firm’s Business and Commercial Transactions Practice Group.
1. See, e.g., National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore
Drilling, 223 (2011) [hereinafter Nat’l Comm’n Report]. The Macondo well was
located in the federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico, on Mississippi Canyon Block 252.
2. See, e.g., Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–
Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,423
(Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
3. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 20,424.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OCS REGULATORY SCHEME THROUGH 2010
The current regulatory scheme governing oil and gas activities on
the OCS took shape, in large part, through a series of crises and
corresponding legislative responses. This section traces the
development of OCS legislation and regulations, from the “Seaweed
Rebellion” of the mid-1900s through the Santa Barbara and Prince
William Sound oil spills in the late 1900s, to provide an overview of the
OCS regulatory scheme as it existed on the eve of the Macondo event.
A. The Dispute Over Coastal Lands and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act
From its origin, federal authority over OCS resources developed
through a series of jurisdictional disputes and environmental crises. The
first event to spur legislation establishing federal authority over oil and
gas activities on the OCS was the post-World War II dispute between
coastal states and the federal government for control of the OCS.4
Offshore oil wells began to operate in shallow coastal waters by the
1890s; by 1919, the oil and natural gas industry had developed
sufficiently to warrant forming its own national trade association, the
American Petroleum Institute (API).5 In the early period of offshore oil
exploration and production, coastal states and local entities generally
exercised authority over activities in their coastal waters, and this
included granting leases for offshore oil wells.6 Then, in 1945, President
Harry S. Truman asserted federal authority over resources in offshore
areas by means of a proclamation to “extend U.S. jurisdiction over the
submerged lands and subsoil of the Outer Continental Shelf,” citing as
justification the national “interest in [the] conservation and prudent

4. See, e.g., Sierra B. Weaver, Local Management of Natural Resources: Should
Local Governments Be Able to Keep Oil Out?, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 232–
34 (2002).
5. See id.; Gordon L. James, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978: Balancing Energy Needs with Environmental Concerns?, 40
LA. L. REV. 177, 178 (1979); R.B. Krueger, The Development and Administration of
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands of the United States, 14 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L.
I NST . 643, 675 (1968); API History, AM . P ETROLEUM I NST ., http://www
.americanpetroleuminstitute.com/globalitems/globalheader pages/about-api/apihistory [perma.cc/QTS9-66BB] (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
6. See James, supra note 5, at 178; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 38 (1947) (noting that California authorized permit-granting for offshore oil and
gas prospecting through state legislation enacted in 1921); Weaver, supra note 4, at
232–33.
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utilization” of mineral resources found there.7 This sparked the first
phase of the “Seaweed Rebellion” conflict between coastal states and
the federal government,8 which in turn led to Supreme Court decisions
recognizing federal authority over offshore lands.9 These disputes
ultimately led to the enactment of two major pieces of federal legislation
in 1953 to resolve state and federal roles with respect to mineral
resources under the continental shelf: the Federal Submerged Lands Act
and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).10
The OCSLA was, and remains, the primary federal statute
governing resource development on submerged lands subject to federal
control. It gives the Secretary of the DOI (the Secretary) authority to
oversee federal OCS lands, including development of resources on the
OCS by means of a competitive bidding process for granting oil and gas
leases.11 The OCSLA declares, as the policy of the United States with
respect to the development of these resources:
[T]he outer Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve
held by the Federal Government for the public, which should be
made available for expeditious and orderly development,
subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is
consistent with the maintenance of competition and other
national needs.12
7. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg.
12, 305 (Sept. 28, 1945) (codified as Executive Order 9633).
8. E.g., Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: FederalState/Provincial Conflicts Over Offshore Energy Development in the United States,
Canada, and Australia, 7 CONN. J. INT’L L., 255, 257–58 (1992).
9. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana,
339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 38.
10. Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953); Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953). The Federal Submerged Lands
Act reverted authority to the states over the submerged coastal lands closest to the
shorelines, setting the boundaries of state authority at three geographical miles from
the state’s recognized coastline, with certain exceptions for historical boundaries in
the Gulf of Mexico. See 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (2012); see also id. §§ 1312–1313. In
litigation following enactment of the Federal Submerged Lands Act, Texas and
Florida established state authority over the area extending to the further boundary of
three marine leagues (or about nine miles) from their respective coastlines. See United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 66 (1960); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121, 129
(1960).
11. See 43 U.S.C. §1337(a). The OCSLA defines the “outer Continental Shelf”
as “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the [seaward boundaries of the
States’ coastal waters], and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1331(a).
12. 43 U.S.C. §1332(3).

236

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

The OCSLA also expressly acknowledges the interests of the states
in this process, declaring that “the rights and responsibilities of all States
. . . to preserve and protect their marine, human, and coastal
environments . . . should be considered and recognized.”13 Federal OCS
policy thus encompasses three main goals: development of resources for
the (economic) benefit of the public, environmental protections, and
maintenance of national interests (among them, the needs of the coastal
states).14 Since each of these cannot be maximized simultaneously, there
is a structural tension between and among the OCSLA’s goals that often
plays out in the balancing of needs and priorities through the OCS
leasing process.
The OCSLA granted the Secretary authority to promulgate
regulations for OCS leasing.15 Within a year of the OCSLA going into
effect, the Secretary set forth the first OCSLA regulations.16 The
Secretary also delegated authority to oversee the OCS leasing program
to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the
DOI, who in turn delegated authority to the Manager of the BLM’s OCS
Office.17 The OCSLA regulations made the BLM responsible for
overseeing activities up to the point of lease issuance and, thereafter, for
royalty collection from oil and gas activities.18 Separately, the
Conservation Division of the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
was responsible for supervising energy production and exploration
activities and for overseeing lessees after leases were issued.19

13. 43 U.S.C. §1332(4)–(5); see also 43 U.S.C. §1345.
14. See Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ.A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046, at *2 (E.D.
La. Aug. 14, 2006) (“[T]he Secretary is required to consider and balance the potential
for environmental harm, the potential for adverse impact to the coastal zone, and the
potential for the discovery of resources, while also ensuring the public a fair and
equitable return on the resources of the OCS.”).
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (2012).
16. See Chapter II-Geological Survey, 19 Fed. Reg. 2655 (May 8, 1954); Chapter
I-Bureau of Land Management, 19 Fed. Reg. 2661 (May 8, 1954).
17. See Amendments to Delegations of Authority with Respect to Mineral
Leases, 18 Fed. Reg. 6126 (Sept. 23, 1954); Delegation of Authority with Respect to
Mineral Leases, 19 Fed. Reg. 6720 (Oct. 19, 1954).
18. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 63.
19. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 30
C.F.R. § 250.10–.11 (1959); Delegation of Authority with Respect to Development
and Leasing of Minerals in Submerged Lands, 18 Fed. Reg. 5715 (1953); Nat’l
Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 63; James, supra note 5, at 179 n.20.
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Between 1953 and 1968, regulators under the OCSLA conducted
twenty-three lease sales.20 The offshore energy industry grew during this
time, as the OCS increasingly became a crucial source of domestic oil and
gas resources.21 The API continued to evolve as well, moving its offices to
Washington, D.C. by the end of the 1960s.22
B. The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Coastal Zone Management Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978
On January 28, 1969, a drilling rig blowout in the Santa Barbara
Channel resulted in an oil spill estimated at up to 100,000 barrels—at the
time, the largest oil spill in United States history.23 Within ten days, DOI
regulators suspended all activities on leases off the coast of California near
the area of the blowout.24 The suspension was supposed to last until
environmental studies could be conducted to inform the next course of
action, but the Santa Barbara oil spill was followed by blowouts in the
Gulf of Mexico in February and December of 1970, and, in September of
1971, the Secretary announced that the California suspension would not
be lifted.25 This led to a challenge brought by oil companies in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the
Secretary’s authority under the OCSLA to suspend operations—but not
indefinitely, without triggering a takings claim.26
Meanwhile, the DOI undertook substantial revisions to its OCSLA
regulations. It issued orders implementing new rules for testing safety
equipment and began to require prior approval of plans and equipment used
in exploration and production activities.27 The API participated actively in the
issuance of these orders, and itself undertook a number of actions, including
drafting recommended practice guidance documents and facilitating the
sharing of technological innovations among offshore operators.28 But the
most significant outcomes from the Santa Barbara oil spill were the major
congressional actions it provoked, including the National Environmental
20. James, supra note 5, at 179.
21. See API History, supra note 5.
22. Id.
23. See Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 28; James, supra note 5, at 180.
24. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 29; James, supra note 5, at 180.
25. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 29–30; James, supra note 5, at 180.
26. See Union Oil of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 751–52 (9th Cir. 1975); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 146–48 (9th Cir. 1973).
27. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 30, 58. The USGS also increased its
scope of enforcement by revamping its inspection program and dramatically
increasing the number of USGS inspectors and engineers. Id. at 30.
28. Id.
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Protection Act (NEPA), the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), and the
1978 Amendments to the OCSLA (the 1978 Amendments).29
1. The National Environmental Policy Act
Signed into law on New Year’s Day in 1970, NEPA had lofty
environmental goals, and early litigation soon ensured that the statute would
play a central role in mandating the consideration of environmental
consequences for federal actions.30 NEPA requires that all federal agencies
include a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) for any “major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.”31 In addition to an assessment of the “environmental impact of
the proposed action,” the EIS must include an assessment of any unavoidable
adverse environmental effects of the action, alternatives to the proposed action
(including no action), consideration of short-term versus long-term
consequences, and any “irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources” the action would require.32
Certain federal actions are not subject to the full EIS review and require
only an abbreviated review known as an Environmental Assessment (EA).33
If the EA process does not identify a significant impact of the federal action,
the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), and the
environmental review process ends.34 Alternatively, some federal actions are

29. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012).
30. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 59 n.23, n.26.
NEPA “declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in
cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare,
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
31. 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
32. Id.; see, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d
66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Regulations implementing NEPA . . . require that an agency
developing an EIS evaluate ‘all reasonable alternatives,’ including a no-action
alternative.”).
33. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3–.4, 1508.9 (2015); see also Blanco v. Burton, 2006
WL 2366046, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2006). The Council on Environmental Quality
is the federal agency with authority to promulgate regulations under NEPA, which are
found at 40 C.F.R. §1500.1–.6.
34. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13.
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exempted from the EIS process as “categorical exclusions,” although these
have limited applicability on the OCS.35
The NEPA review process does not mandate any particular outcome (that
is, the agency is under no obligation to select the most environmentally
beneficial alternative), but the process does require a thorough (and time- and
resource-consuming) review and consideration of environmental impacts.36
2. The Coastal Zone Management Act
Another major piece of federal legislation provoked by the Santa
Barbara spill, the CZMA, applies to all coastal states that elect to
participate in developing a coastal resource plan and confers review
authority onto those that do, with the goal of resolving conflicts between
state and federal entities over coastal resources.37 The CZMA provided
grants to coastal states to enable the states to develop and implement
management programs to protect natural resources.38 Once the Secretary
of Commerce approves a state’s management program, federal activities
that affect the state’s coastal zone must “be carried out in a manner which
is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable
policies of the State management program[],” and states gain the right to
review certain federal actions for consistency with the state’s coastal
management plan.39 With respect to the OCS leasing program, applicants
for federal licenses or permits affecting a state’s coastal zone or its
resources must provide certification that the proposed activity complies
and is consistent with the state’s management program; this requirement
is generally referred to as a “consistency determination.”40 States’ rights

35. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4; see, e.g., Notice of Intent to Conduct a Review of
Categorical Exclusions for Outer Continental Shelf Decisions, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,418
(Oct. 8, 2010); Categorical Exclusion Reviews, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/Environmental-Stewardship/Environmental-Assessment
/NEPA/policy/ce/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2015); see also Nat’l Comm’n
Report, supra note 1, at 81.
36. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352
(1989); Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2006).
37. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454–1456 (2012); see also James, supra note 5, at 182–
83.
38. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454, 1455.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A); see James, supra note 5, at 183.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c); see e.g., Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *11 (E.D. La.
Aug. 14, 2006). Regulations under the CZMA were not promulgated until several
years after the statute went into effect, but the CZMA nevertheless “initially served as
the primary program for ensuring against undue risk to . . . marine and coastal
resources” because these considerations were not fully integrated into the OCSLA
until passage of the 1978 Amendments. See Sam Kalen, The BP Macondo Well
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under the CZMA are tempered by the federal government’s ultimate
authority to effectively overrule a state’s (in)consistency determination.41
3. The OCSLA’s 1978 Amendments
Forged by the competing pressures of environmental concerns and the
perceived need to streamline access to domestic oil and gas in response to the
oil embargo and energy crisis of the 1970s, the OCSLA leasing process took
its current form with the 1978 Amendments.42 The 1978 Amendments put in
place a leasing process with four main phases: (1) preparation of a five-year
leasing plan, (2) the lease sale, (3) exploration, and (4) development and
production.43 In the first phase, the Secretary prepares the leasing plan, which
includes a selection of proposed lease locations and a schedule of proposed
lease sales that will, in the Secretary’s determination, best meet the nation’s
energy needs within a five-year plan period.44 Second, the agency calls for,
accepts, and evaluates nominations for potential lease areas, then publishes a
recommended list in advance of the proposed lease sale date.45 The Secretary
then grants leases, on terms set by the agency, to the highest qualified
Exploration Plan: Wither the Coastal Zone Management Act?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 11079, 11080 (2010).
41. Lynn S. Sletto, Piecemeal Legislative Proposals: An Inappropriate
Approach to Managing Offshore Oil Drilling, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 557, 562
(2003); see also Blanco, 2006 WL 2366046, at *11 (“If the state objects, a federal
agency may proceed with its proposed activity only if it has concluded that
consistency with the enforceable policies of the state's management program is
prohibited by existing law applicable to the federal agency, and has described to the
state, in writing, the legal impediments to full consistency with the state's policies; or
if it determines that its activity is fully consistent with the state's enforceable
policies.”).
42. See James, supra note 5 at 185–87. Up to the time of the Santa Barbara oil
spill, disputes over oil and gas development on the OCS had centered on who had the
right to revenues from mineral resources, and not on whether or how to develop those
resources, or how environmental and safety considerations should factor into those
decisions. Mark Davis, Lessons Unlearned: The Legal and Policy Legacy of the BP
Deepwater Horizon Spill, 3 WASH. & LEE. J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 155, 168
(2012); James, supra note 5, at 179, 181, 185. The Santa Barbara oil spill and other
events captured the public’s attention and inspired a series of environmental
legislation in the 1970s. See James, supra note 5, at 181; see also note 62, infra. The
passage of NEPA in 1969, CZMA in 1972, and the 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA
renewed the emphasis on safety and environmental protection, in addition to
increasing the emphasis placed on states’ roles in the leasing process. See 43 U.S.C.
§1802 (2012); see also James, supra note 5, at 186–87. At the same time, the oil
embargo and energy shortage of the early 1970s brought urgency to the development
of domestic oil and gas resources, and OCS leasing was viewed as a key component
of United States energy independence. See James, supra note 5, at 185.
43. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1340, 1344, 1345, 1351.
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1337.
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bidders.46 In the third phase, lessees submit exploration plans, with
details of proposed well locations, activities, and equipment, for
evaluation and approval.47 In the fourth phase, lessees submit
development and production plans for approval.48 The policies of the
OCSLA are woven into its directives, mandating the factors that the
Secretary must consider during each phase.49
The 1978 Amendments also revised the guidelines for health, safety,
and environmental (HS&E) regulations. The OCSLA deploys a “best
available and safest technologies” (BAST) standard for all technologies
for drilling operations conducted on rigs and other installations.50 The
BAST standard encapsulates the three OCSLA policies of environment,
development, and national and state interests by requiring technologies
“to be economically feasible, wherever equipment failure would have a
significant effect on safety, health, or the environment, except where the
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient
to justify the incremental costs of utilizing such technologies.”51 Lessees
and permit holders must also conduct operations within the leased or
permitted area “in compliance with regulations intended to protect
persons, property, and the environment on the [OCS].”52 The regulators’
enforcement authority allows for onsite inspections to ensure compliance
with environmental and safety regulations.53
NEPA and the CZMA are integrated into the OCSLA leasing
process, which requires consideration of both environmental impacts
under NEPA and state coastal management plans under the CZMA. In
the five-year plan phase, which is considered a “major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” under
NEPA, the Secretary must conduct an EIS.54 OCSLA regulations also
require NEPA analysis during the lease sale stage; at this phase,
however, the agency conducts only a more limited EA before
recommending the list of areas to be leased.55 The OCSLA effectively
deems at least the first development and production plan in any OCS
planning area (other than in the western and central Gulf of Mexico,
46. Id.
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c).
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (2012).
49. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1344(a)(1), 1344(a)(3), 1346.
50. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a)(1), 1347(b).
51. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b).
52. 43 U.S.C. § 1348(b)(2); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1348(b)(1).
53. See 43 U.S.C. § 1348 (1998).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006); e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel,
865 F.2d 288, 295–97 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
55. See 30 C.F.R. § 556.0 (2015).
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where extensive development activities have already occurred) to be a
major federal action requiring the agency to conduct a full EIS at least
once per area.56 Thus, during the exploration and development and
production phases, regulators conduct NEPA analyses—or at least
review and reconsider the analyses conducted during prior phases.57
Likewise, the OCSLA expressly invokes CZMA compliance,
requiring the implementing agency to submit exploration plans for
review by the applicable state’s Coastal Zone Management agency and,
if necessary, to account for any state objections to the plan.58 The
exploration plans require a consistency certification from any affected
state unless the Secretary of Commerce makes a contrary consistency
determination or otherwise determines that the plan serves the interests
of national security.59 States also have authority under the CZMA to
review and comment on development and production plans, to identify
relevant legal and other factors for the Secretary to consider during the
leasing process, and to submit comments on the leasing program that the
Secretary is required—within certain bounds—to accept.60 Although
inherent tension exists between the environmental focus of the CZMA
and NEPA and the expeditious development directives of the OCSLA,
the 1978 Amendments attempted to bind these goals together, at least
procedurally, within certain OCS leasing steps.61

56. See ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33404, OFFSHORE OIL AND
GAS DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 12 (2014).
57. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (2015); 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.232, 550.269; James, supra
note 5, at 192; VANN, supra note 56, at 12.
58. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351; see also 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.226, 550.232, 550.235
(2015).
59. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351; 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1992).
60. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1345, 1351; see also 30 C.F.R. § 550.267.
61. See, e.g., James, supra note 5, at 194 (“The overriding concern of the
Secretary of Commerce under the CZMA is protection of the coastal environment
from adverse impact caused by OCS development. On the other hand, the Secretary
of the Interior’s concern under the [the OCSLA] is to proceed with development of
the [OCS] while minimizing environmental impacts. As a result, the two secretaries
are empowered to make decisions regarding the same subject matter under separate
acts whose objectives are not entirely consistent.”).
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Legislation to resolve such conflicting goals and directives was
characteristic of the approach taken towards the OCS in the 1970s.
Responses to the Santa Barbara oil spill and other environmental
concerns during the 1970s were overwhelmingly addressed through
congressional action, with litigation often leading to further legislative
enactments.62 Regulations played neither a primary nor a direct role in
shaping the OCSLA regulatory scheme; instead, Congress often resolved
the interplay among the OCSLA, NEPA, and the CZMA through
legislative amendments.
C. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The 1978 Amendments also introduced liability for offshore facility
owners and operators, remedies for parties with economic losses due to
oil spills, and an Oil Spill Liability Fund as an alternative for recovery.63
These liability issues became the renewed focus of legislative action,
mainly with regard to vessels, after the Exxon Valdez tanker grounded
on March 24, 1989, spilling approximately eleven million barrels of oil
into Alaska’s Prince William Sound.64 In response to the Exxon Valdez
spill and three other oil spills that followed in rapid succession in United
States waters, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)
quickly and nearly unanimously, introducing a new comprehensive oil
spill liability scheme that requires “responsible parties” to pay for a broad

62. Other environmental legislation enacted in the same decade included the
Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407–7431 (1970); the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (1972); the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1361–1423h (1972); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (1973);
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (1974); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (1976); the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (1976); the Magnuson-Stevens
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801–1891d (1976); the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (1976); the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (1977); and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (1980).
63. James, supra note 5, at 201–02.
64. See Davis, supra note 42, at 163.
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range of oil spill-related costs.65 Elements of the new liability scheme had
been on the table for fifteen years at the time, but were only enacted into
legislation following the Exxon Valdez oil spill.66
In addition to establishing a new oil spill liability scheme and recovery
fund, OPA’s main provisions address technology, planning for oil spills, and
management of oil spill responses.67 OPA mandates specific technology
requirements, notably for double hulls in tankers.68 OPA also calls for worstcase scenario planning for oil spills at multiple spatial scales ranging from
national to facility-specific.69
Although OPA is primarily concerned with vessels carrying oil, certain
provisions apply to offshore facilities, and responsible parties include the
owners and operators of those facilities.70 Responsible parties for offshore
facilities, like responsible parties for vessels, are required to maintain
evidence of financial responsibility up to the statutory applicable maximum
liability amount.71
DOI regulators also assume responsibility for certain OPA requirements,
including planning with respect to offshore facility-specific response plans
and some oil spill response activities.72 These regulations detail the
requirements for facility-specific response plans, and the regulators’ authority
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702; Robert Force, Martin Davies, and Joshua S. Force,
Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and
State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TULANE L. REV. 889, 893 (2011); John Wyeth
Griggs, BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 32 Energy L.J. 57, 59–60 (2011); Gaia J. Larsen,
Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce Innovation to
Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL L. J. 139, 151 (2012);
Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo Disaster: Business
as Usual or Sea Change?, 36 HOUSTON J. OF INT’L L. 147, 151 (2014). The other oil
spills occurred three months after the Exxon Valdez spill (all within a twenty-four hour
period) in Rhode Island coastal waters, the Delaware River, and the Houston Ship
Channel. S. REP. 101-94, 2, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
66. Griggs, supra note 65, at 59. The Exxon Valdez oil spill also resulted, at least
temporarily, in increased funding allocated to research and development for oil spill
prevention technologies. Larsen, supra note 65, at 12.
67. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321; see also Griggs, supra note 65, at 59; Andrew Hartsig,
Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL
L. J. 269, 280; JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL
SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND AND GOVERNANCE 13-16 (2012).
68. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (2015); see also Ramseur, supra note 67, at 13.
69. See, 33 U.S.C. § 1321; see also Hartsig, supra note 67, at 280–81.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f); see also Weaver, supra note 65, at 151 n.19.
71. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716.
72. See 30 C.F.R. part 254; see also Hartsig, supra note 67, at 281-83; Nat’l
Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 83. Agency responsibilities under OPA have been
augmented via a series of Executive Orders and Memoranda of Understanding.
Ramseur, supra note 67, at 21. Following reorganization of the MMS, the DOI agency
currently assuming these responsibilities is BSEE, as addressed infra.
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extends to determining what constitutes a worst-case scenario and what
response is adequate.73
A relatively new agency, the Minerals Management Service (MMS),
became responsible for the additional duties imposed by OPA. In 1982, prior
to OPA’s passage, Secretary of the Interior James Watt had overhauled the
regulatory structure overseeing OCSLA administration.74 Via Secretarial
Order, Secretary Watt created the MMS as a new entity to take over the full
suite of OCSLA leasing, enforcement, and revenue collection responsibilities
previously shared between the BLM and USGS.75 Within the new MMS,
these roles were divided between the Offshore Energy and Minerals
Management program and the Minerals Revenue Management program.76
Shortly after its creation, the MMS oversaw an ambitious five-year leasing
plan that set an initial goal of leasing nearly one billion acres in federal
waters.77 Because congressionally-issued moratoriums limited the areas
available for lease to only the Gulf of Mexico and parts of Alaska, the scope
of the five-year plan was not realized.78 However, Secretary Watt’s innovation
of offering area-wide leases (rather than leases of only individual tracts)
became—and remains—a part of the OCS leasing scheme.79
In the years prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the MMS had begun to
study and consider revising its safety program. Alarmed by catastrophic
and deadly sinkings of offshore facilities off the coasts of Norway and
Canada and production platform explosions off the coasts of Scotland and
Louisiana, all of which took place in the 1980s, the MMS “had come to
appreciate that a command and control, prescriptive approach to regulation
did not adequately address the risks generated by the offshore industry’s
73. 30 C.F.R. § 254.21 (2015); see Davis, supra note 42, at 166.
74. See Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 (Jan. 19, 1982).
75. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 (Jan. 19, 1982); Dep’t of the
Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 Amendment No. 1 (May 10, 1982); Dep’t of the
Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3071 Amendment No. 2 (May 26, 1982); Dep’t of the
Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3087 (Dec. 3, 1982); Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial
Order No. 3087 Amendment No. 2 (Feb. 7, 1983); see Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra
note 1, at 63–64.
76. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 65.
77. Davis, supra note 42, at 169.
78. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 65–67.
79. Id. In the area of HS&E, the MMS also promulgated “an array of prescriptive
safety regulations: hundreds of pages of technical requirements for pollution
prevention and control, drilling, well-completion operations, oil and gas wellworkovers (major well maintenance), production safety systems, platforms and
structures, pipelines, well production, and well-control and -production safety
training.” Id. at 68; see 30 C.F.R. Part 250. The MMS already had responsibility for
annual and unscheduled inspections of operations, partly for the purpose of overseeing
these safety requirements, before OPA added oil spill response planning to its
responsibilities. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 68.
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new technologies and exploration, development and production activities,
including industrial expansion into deeper waters.”80 Regulators in other
countries began to adopt risk-based approaches that could generate
positive feedback loops in safety policies and practices, rather than a
“prescriptive regulation and inspection model,” and the MMS began to
consider such a shift in its approach to HS&E regulation as well.81
The central features of these risk-based approaches are industrydriven risk assessments, paired with systematic risk management
procedures, and backstopped with—rather than driven by—specific
minimum safety standards.82 In the 1980s, an internal MMS task force and
the National Research Council’s Marine Board studied MMS safety
procedures at the agency’s request and recommended that the MMS focus
on identifying and combatting safety risks and circumstances,
“particularly those involving human factors, operational procedures, and
modification of equipment and facilities,” and on employing inspections
in order to systematically identify risks rather than continuing to focus on
noncompliance by means of regulatory specifications.83 Although these
recommendations had already been made at the time of OPA’s enactment,
none were incorporated into the new legislation.84

80. Id. at 68–70. The Alexander Kielland, a rig and offshore housing structure,
capsized off the coast of Norway in 1980, and the Ocean Ranger sank off the coast of
Canada in 1982. Explosions occurred at the Piper Alpha platform off the coast of
Scotland in 1988 and on a platform off the coast of Louisiana in South Pass Block 60
in 1989. Collectively, the accidents accounted for hundreds of fatalities. Id.
81. Id. at 69.
82. Id. (“Under the new safety-management model, minimum standards for
structural and operational integrity (well control, prevention of fires and explosions,
and worker safety) remained in place. But the new burden now rested on industry to
assess the risks associated with offshore activities and demonstrate that each facility
had the policies, plans, and systems in place to manage those risks.”)
83. See id. at 70 (citing Marine Bd. of the Nat’l Research Council Comm. on
Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continental Shelf Operations, Alternatives for
Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations (Washington: Nat’l Acad. Press, 1990)
3, available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1517&page=1).
84. Id. (“Ironically, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, but failed to
address any of the regulatory deficiencies identified by the Marine Board, while
adding to MMS’s regulatory responsibilities.”).
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D. The OCS Regulatory Scheme in Place at the Time of the Macondo
Event: SEMS Proposals Are Still Not Formalized
In April 2010—the month of the Macondo event—the OCS regulatory
scheme and the overall framework of environmental laws and regulations
reflected the evolving response to the Santa Barbara and Exxon Valdez oil
spills.85 The tensions among the three central policies of the OCSLA were
counterbalanced by new legislation. The 1978 Amendments and the CZMA
augmented states’ roles, while NEPA, OPA, and other environmental
legislation added to OCLSA’s environmental protections. All the while, the
offshore energy industry continued to grow, especially in the western Gulf of
Mexico, and the MMS focused on regulation and revenue collection.
The MMS characterized its own scheme as having “both prescriptive and
performance elements” and continued to take initial steps toward developing
its HS&E regulations during the 1990s and early 2000s.86 In 1991, the MMS
published a notice requesting comments on “alternative strategies to promote
safety and environmental protection, specifically a requirement that outer
continental shelf lessees and/or operators develop, maintain, and implement
‘a safety and environmental management program.’”87 No SEMS regulations
materialized from this call for comments, or from an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking in 2006, or from a proposed rulemaking in 2009 that
would have implemented some elements of a SEMS approach on the OCS.88

85. See Griggs, supra note 65, at 59. Over the same time span, there was a general
increase in legislation providing greater worker and environmental protections—
including several federal statutes governing the OCS. Davis, supra note 42, at 173
(referencing NEPA, the Clean Water Act, the CZMA, the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, the 1978 Amendments to the OCSLA, and OPA).
86. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)–Safety
and Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,277, 29,277 (May 22,
2006).
87. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 71.
88. See Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. at 29,277;
Safety and Environmental Management Systems for Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas Operations, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,639 (June 17, 2009); see also Nat’l Comm’n Report,
supra note 1, at 72.
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Thus at the time of the Macondo event, the MMS’s partially prescriptive
system included some HS&E regulations and an inspection program, but
operators could still choose whether to adopt a SEMS plan.89 In 2009, nearly
half of the operators on the OCS had not yet done so.90 In the absence of
formal MMS action on SEMS, the API had developed its own “recommended
practice” safety guidance documents, along with a suite of standards, reports,
studies, and technical publications that were widely used by the offshore
industry.91 In practice, the API assumed “a dominant role in developing safety
standards for the oil and gas industry.”92
II. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
The blowout of the Macondo well on April 20, 2010 led to the latest
revamping of the OCS regulatory scheme.93 It resulted in eleven worker
deaths, an oil spill estimated at nearly five million barrels discharged into the
Gulf of Mexico, and massive response and cleanup efforts.94 Unlike the Santa
Barbara and Exxon Valdez oil spills, however, the Macondo event has not
sparked any significant congressional action to reshape regulation of the
OCS.95 Instead, the response has been primarily executive and regulatory,
including moratoriums, increased enforcement efforts, the reorganization of
the regulatory agency, and a series of new rules on workplace safety and

89. E.g., Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. at
29,277; see also Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 71 (“At the time of the
Macondo blowout – almost 20 years after [MMS’s original proposal to develop
SEMS] – MMS had still not published a rule mandating that all operators have plans
to manage safety and environmental risks. The agency’s efforts to adopt a more
rigorous and effective risk-based safety regulatory regime were repeatedly revised,
refined, delayed, and blocked alternatively by industry or skeptical agency political
appointees. MMS thus never achieved the reform of its regulatory oversight of drilling
safety consonant with practices that most other countries had embraced decades
earlier.”).
90. Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo Disaster:
The Role of the Regulator, 36 HOUSTON J. OF INT’L L. 379, 409 (2014).
91. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 71, 225, 228.
92. Id. at 225.
93. Id. at vi.
94. Id. at vi, 211 n.76.
95. E.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42942,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: RECENT ACTIVITIES AND ONGOING
DEVELOPMENTS 13–15 (2015).
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training, blowout prevention, well design, and drilling safety.96 This section
provides a brief overview of some of these reforms, focusing primarily on the
SEMS rules.
In immediate response to the Macondo event, Secretary of the Interior
Ken Salazar halted deepwater drilling activities in the Gulf of Mexico by
imposing a moratorium, which was issued on May 28, 2010 and was intended
to last six months.97 However, oil and gas services providers succeeded in
enjoining the moratorium on June 22, 2010.98 The Secretary then rescinded
the initial moratorium and on July 12, 2010 issued a second moratorium that
was intended to remain in place until November 30, 2010 “or until such earlier
time that the Secretary determines that deepwater drilling operations can
proceed safely.”99 The Secretary also announced that interim safety rules
would be issued and implemented during this time.100 The second moratorium
was lifted on October 12, 2010, and the initial SEMS regulations were
published in the Federal Register three days later.101 The first new drilling
permit issued after the moratorium was not approved until February 28,
2011.102
96. See Dep’t of the Interior, Reforms since the Deepwater Horizon Tragedy,
available at http://www.boem.gov/Reforms-since-the-Deepwater-Horizon-Tragedy/;
Joint Industry Offshore Operating Procedures and Equipment Task Force, Final
Report on Industry Recommendations to Improve Offshore Operating Procedures
and Equipment 2 (Mar. 13, 2012), available at http://www.api.org/~/media/files/oiland-natural-gas/exploration/offshore/prevention-final-report-031312.pdf [hereinafter
JITF Report].
97. Decision Memorandum for the Secretary from the Director of the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 1-2 (Oct. 1, 2010).
98. See Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630–32
(E.D. La. 2010).
99. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y Salazar Issues New Suspensions
to Guide Safe Pause on Deepwater Drilling: Bromwich to Engage Public, Industry
and Stakeholders in Deepwater Drilling Safety Reforms (July 12, 2010), available at
https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Secretary-Salazar-Issues-New-Suspensionsto-Guide-Safe-Pause-on-Deepwater-Drilling.
100. Id. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement
(BOEMRE) issued NTL No. 2010-N05 on June 8, 2010 in order to immediately
implement some initial safety measures.
101. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–
Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610 (Oct. 15,
2010); Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to
Michael R. Bromwich, Dir. of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation, &
Enforcement (BOEMRE) 1 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov
/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Deepwater-Drilling-May-Resume-for-Operators-WhoClear-Higher-Bar-for-Safety-Environmental-Protection.cfm.
102. Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation, & Enforcement,
BOEMRE Approves First Deepwater Drilling Permit To Meet Important New Safety
Standards in Gulf of Mexico (Feb. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Press-Releases/2011/press0228.aspx.
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Reorganization of the MMS’s responsibilities and structure was similarly
swift. Within three weeks of the Macondo event, Secretary Salazar stripped
the MMS of its enforcement responsibilities and, one week after that,
announced a restructuring of the MMS into three new agencies, each taking
on a subset of the range of functions that had previously been handled by the
MMS.103 This reorganization would ultimately result in the creation of the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural Resources
Revenue (ONRR).104 Secretary Salazar’s justification for the restructuring
echoed the OCSLA policies—it had the goals of “improv[ing] the
management, oversight, and accountability of activities on the Outer
Continental Shelf; ensur[ing] a fair return to the taxpayer from royalty and
revenue collection and disbursement activities; and provid[ing] independent
safety and environmental oversight and enforcement of offshore activities.”105
Though accomplished quickly, this reorganization was an idea that had been
considered before the Macondo event; DOI and congressional studies had
already recommended MMS restructuring years earlier.106
Within months of the Macondo event, the DOI began formal
rulemaking on a number of subjects—a process that is still ongoing.
Rulemaking efforts have included final rules on safety measures, SEMS,
and OPA liability limits for offshore facilities, as well as proposed rules
for exploration activities in the Arctic, blowout preventers and other

103. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 55 (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, Salazar Launches Safety and Environmental Protection Reforms to
Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (May 11, 2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Safety-andEnvironmental-Protection-Reforms-to-Toughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-andGas-Operations.cfm [perma.cc/H4G6-927C]); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May 19, 2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-ConflictingMissions.cfm [perma.cc/AK6H-PABS]; Sec’y of the Interior, Establishment of the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue, No. 3299 (May 19,
2010), http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/ [perma.cc/RT6R-HQRA].
104. Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 55 n.2. ONRR functions were
separated on October 1, 2010, and, until BOEM and BSEE structures were in place,
the residual roles of the MMS were handled by an interim organization, BOEMRE.
See Order No. 3302, Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior, Change the Name of the
Minerals Management Service to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation, and Enforcement, available at http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/0/doc/165
/Page1.aspx.
105. Order No. 3299, Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior, Establishment of the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (May 19, 2010).
106. See Ramseur, supra note 95, at 11.
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drilling procedures, and the regulation of dispersants.107 In addition, within
five years of the Macondo event, BSEE issued forty Notices to Lessees
and Operators (NTLs) to offer agency guidance and interpretation outside
the formal rulemaking process, including one NTL that provisionally
implemented new safety measures until the SEMS and other new safety
rules could be fully put in place.108
In contrast to the flurry of regulatory activity—and despite more than
sixty congressional hearings held and more than 150 legislative proposals put
forth in the 111th Congress alone—federal legislation in response to the
Macondo event has been minimal.109 Although a few pieces of legislation
related to oil spills have been enacted, HS&E subjects have been addressed
only in isolated provisions; and no legislation has taken on these subjects
comprehensively.110 The most significant legislative proposal related to these
107. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Increased
Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed.
Reg. 63,345 (Oct. 14, 2010); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer
Continental Shelf–Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg.
63,609 (Oct. 15, 2010); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental
Shelf—Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems,77 Fed. Reg.
50,856 (Aug. 22, 2012); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental
Shelf–Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg.
20,423 (Apr. 5, 2013); Consumer Price Index Adjustments of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 Limit of Liability for Offshore Facilities,79 Fed. Reg. 73,832 (Dec. 12, 2014);
Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Requirements
for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, 80 Fed. Reg. 9916
(Feb. 24, 2015).
108. See Ramseur, supra note 95, at 11. These NTLs “are formal documents that
provide clarification, description, or interpretation of a regulation or OCS standard;
provide guidelines on the implementation of a special lease stipulation or regional
requirement; provide a better understanding of the scope and meaning of a regulation
by explaining BSEE interpretation of a requirement; or transmit administrative
information such as current telephone listings and a change in BSEE personnel or
office address.” BSEE, Notices, Letters, and Information to Lessees and Operators
(NTLs), http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Notices-to-Lessees/index/
[perma.cc/YU6R-ZQTN] (last visited July 5, 2015). NTLs are utilized by other DOI
agencies as well. See Blair Klein, Notices to Lessees Under Federal Leases,
Proceedings of the Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Twenty-Fifth Annual Institute (1979).
109. See Ramseur, supra note 95, at 4–5.
110. See id. at 13–15. More than five years after the Macondo event, only one such
piece of federal legislation had been enacted—the RESTORE Act. See id, at 4–5.
Passed in 2012 as part of P.L. 112-141, the “Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st
Century Act” or the “MAP–21 Act,” the RESTORE Act established a Gulf Coast
Restoration Fund in the General Treasury, into which eighty percent of certain Clean
Water Act Section 311 penalties are to be paid by the Macondo event’s responsible
parties. See H.R. 4348, 112th Cong. §1602 (2012). Funds are distributed to a number
of entities focused on designated restoration and related activities in the Gulf states
affected by the oil spill. Ramseur, supra note 95, at 5.
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concerns was the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources
(CLEAR) Act, which passed the House but not the Senate.111 The CLEAR
Act included a number of HS&E-related provisions: mandatory SEMS for
OCS operations, equipment safety standards and inspection and certification
requirements for blowout preventers, and well cementing performance
requirements.112 Nevertheless, some provisions of the CLEAR Act, such as
the replacement of the MMS with three new bureaus, were implemented
directly by DOI regulation, bypassing the legislative process.113
A. Key Provisions of the SEMS Regulations
An interim final rule published on October 14, 2010 put certain
safety measures in place.114 The final rule on Safety and Environmental
Management Systems (the Workplace Safety Rule) was published on
October 15, 2010, just short of six months after the Macondo event.115
This rule included many of the same provisions that had stalled at the
proposed rulemaking stage four years earlier.116 It was followed by a
notice of proposed rulemaking, published September 14, 2011 and made
final on April 5, 2013, for a rule (SEMS II) to “provid[e] greater
protection by supplementing operators’ SEMS programs with employee
training, empowering field level personnel with safety management
decisions and strengthening auditing procedures by requiring them to be
completed by independent third parties.”117 SEMS II “supplements the
requirements in [API’s Recommended Practice 75 (API RP 75)] to
ensure that all companies are implementing current best practices and

111. See Griggs, supra note 65, at 76. Similarly, the “Blowout Prevention Act of
2010,” including a repeal of liability limits and other revisions to OPA, passed the
House but failed to emerge from a Senate committee. See id. at 76.
112. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534,
111th Cong. §§ 102, 205; see also Griggs, supra note 65, at 77 n.141.
113. Id.
114. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Increased
Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75 Fed.
Reg. 63,345 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
115. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Safety
and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,609 (Oct. 15, 2010) (to be
codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250); see also SEMS Fact Sheet, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance
/Safety-and-Environmental-Management-Systems---SEMS/Fact-Sheet/
[https://perma.cc/DRV6-24YA] (last visited July 6, 2015).
116. See Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,610;
see also Ramseur, supra note 95, at 12 n.56.
117. See BSEE, supra note 115.
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establishing well-functioning SEMS programs.”118 The SEMS II rule
required operators on the OCS to submit their first audits by November
15, 2013 and to conduct audits in compliance with the rule by June 4,
2015.119
The Workplace Safety Rule thus makes SEMS mandatory for the
first time on the OCS.120 It incorporates by reference all thirteen elements
of API RP 75, as well as some additional requirements.121 The Workplace
Safety Rule, as applied to offshore facilities, requires operators to:
assemble safety and environmental information, assess facility-level risk
through a hazards analysis, implement a program to manage facility or
operations changes, establish safe work practices, conduct safety and
technical training for employees and contractors, maintain mechanical
integrity, conduct pre-startup reviews of all systems, develop emergency
response and control plans and procedures for incident investigations,
maintain SEMS program documentation, and conduct internal audits at
regular intervals.122
SEMS II augments the Workplace Safety Rule’s requirements and
adds details.123 Several of the elements added by the SEMS II rule focus
on “key ways for personnel to help ensure safe performance of oil and
gas activities on the OCS.”124 SEMS II requires facilities to establish stop
work authority (SWA) and ultimate work authority (UWA) procedures
aimed at authorizing any personnel to stop potentially dangerous
activities and clarifying who has decision-making authority,
respectively.125 SWA makes it the responsibility of any individual to stop
work being done at a facility if that person witnesses an activity “creating
imminent risk or danger.”126 The procedures outlining a facility’s SWA
118. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–
Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,423,
20,424 (Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
119. See Bureau of Safety and Envt’l Enforcement, Interim Policy Document:
Safety and Environmental Management Systems Implementation, IPD No. 2013-01
(effective Jan. 4, 2013), available at http://www.bsee.gov/WorkArea
/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=36507222399.
120. Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,610; see
also SEMS Fact Sheet, supra note 115.
121. Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,610.
122. See SEMS Fact Sheet, supra note 115.
123. See Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 20,424.
124. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 20,424.
125. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1930, 250.1931 (2015); see also Revisions to Safety and
Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,424.
126. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1930(a); see also Revisions to Safety and Environmental
Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,424.
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program must be presented at every orientation and reviewed at every
safety meeting.127 UWA procedures set forth the “requirements
establishing who has UWA on the facility for operational safety and
decision-making at any given time.”128 The SWA and UWA procedures
are intended to dovetail, so that once a person witnesses an immediate
risk and exercises SWA, resulting in a work stoppage, the person with
UWA then determines whether the risk has been resolved such that work
can resume.129
In addition, SEMS II requires that an independent accredited auditor
conduct audits of the SEMS program’s effectiveness.130 Specifically, the
regulations require facilities to conduct audits meeting the specified APR
RP 75 requirements and using an Audit Service Provider (ASP) that is
accredited by a BSEE-approved Accreditation Body (AB).131
Qualifications for these ASPs and ABs are largely set forth in API
publications incorporated by reference into the regulations.132 Under this
program, an audit team led by an independent ASP—not BSEE —will
perform audits of each SEMS program on a three-year cycle.133 BSEE’s
role in the auditing process is to approve the ABs that in turn accredit the
ASPs.134
B. Health, Safety, and Environment Regulations Before and After the
Macondo Event
The SEMS regulations in some ways represent a departure from the
OCS regulatory scheme in existence prior to the Macondo event. BSEE
envisions the SEMS program as “the cornerstone of BSEE’s move
toward a hybrid regulatory approach” that will “focus both industry’s
127. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1930(e); see also Revisions to Safety and Environmental
Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,431.
128. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed.
Reg.at 20,424; see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.1931.
129. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg.
20,431.
130. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1920; see also Revisions to Safety and Environmental
Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,424.
131. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1920, 250.1921 (2015).
132. See id. §§ 250.1921, 250.1922.
133. Id.
134. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 20,430. In response to a comment to the proposed rule, BSEE clarified that only the
leaders of the audit team must be ASP employees, representatives, or agents.
Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,430.
The remaining members of the audit team can be operator personnel in order to allow
the operator “flexibility to utilize in-house expertise on the audit team.” Revisions to
Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,430.
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and BSEE’s attention, resources, and initiatives on . . . an underlying
safety culture to promote continuous improvements in safety and
environmental performance.”135 SEMS is intended to be a “dynamic
program,” and BSEE has made efforts to increase the flexibility of its
rules and to make them less prescriptive; this includes allowing operators
to propose alternative procedures and technologies for BSEE’s approval,
provided they meet safety and environmental protection standards at
least equivalent to those set forth in BSEE’s regulations.136 Some have
described the new SEMS approach as “methodologically distinct,” and
BSEE itself acknowledges that the new approach constitutes a departure
from the often-prescriptive OCS regulatory scheme employed in the
past.137
Another shift has taken place among the key players participating in
the OCS regulatory scheme. Some participants are new. The DOI created
the Offshore Energy Safety Advisory Commission (OESAC) to fill a
research and advisory role for BSEE.138 In 2011, the API created the
Center for Offshore Safety (COS) to create SEMS audit documents and
auditor certification processes and to otherwise promote OCS safety
programs.139 Other role players remain: the MMS (in its new incarnation
135. Issue Memorandum from Doug Morris, Chief, Office of Offshore Regulatory
Programs, to Brian Salerno, Director, SEMS Program Summary – First Audit Cycle
2011-2013 (July 23, 2014).
136. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 20,426, 20,427, 20,433.
137. Betsy Baker & Roman Sidortsov, The Legal and Regulatory Regime for
Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources in the U.S. Arctic, 1, 38–39 (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/environment
_energy_resources/resources/baker_sidortsov_hydrocabon_Arctic.authcheckdam.pd
f; see, e.g., Oil and Gas and Sulphur in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)–Safety and
Environmental Management Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,277, 29,277 (May 22, 2006)
( “M M S ’ s i m p l e m e n t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s h a v e b o t h p r e s c r i p t i v e a n d
performance elements.”).
138. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Safety and Envt’l Enforcement,
Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, available at http://www.bsee.gov
/uploadedFiles/BSEE/About_BSEE/Public_Engagement/Ocean_Energy_Safety_Ad
visory_Committee/2011OceanEnergySafetyAdvisoryCommitteeCharter.pdf; see
also Hartsig, supra note 67, at 297-98 & 298 n.207. In 2013, the OESAC’s Safety
Management Subcommittee made a number of recommendations for substantial
revision to the SEMS regulations. See Letter from Thomas O. Hunter, Chairman,
Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Comm., to James A. Watson, Director, Bureau of
Safety and Envt.’l Enforcement (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://www.bsee
.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/About_BSEE/Public_Engagement/Ocean_Energy_Safety
_Advisory_Committee/OESC%20Recommendations%20January%202013%20Mee
ting%20Chairman%20Letter%20to%20BSEE%20012513.pdf.
139. See Center for Offshore Safety: Establishing a Culture of Safety, AM.
PETROLEUM INST., http://www.centerforoffshoresafety.org/ [https://perma.cc/G6VT7ZCC] (last visited July 5, 2015); see also Weaver, supra note 90, at 404.
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as BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR) and the API (which aside from the DOI is
the oldest of all the OCS organizations still actively participating in OCS
regulation).140
New cooperative endeavors are also part of the post-Macondo
regulatory landscape. The SEMS regulations contain numerous
statements about flexibility and incorporate many of the API’s
publications by reference, most notably APR RP 75.141 In addition, BSEE
and COS will work together to evaluate industry compliance by
developing “indicators to gauge industry OCS performance,”142 and a
number of the API’s Joint Industry Task Force recommendations have
been implemented by BSEE through NTLs.143 Despite the changes to the
OCS regulatory scheme, the participants—regulators and industry
representatives—are not fundamentally different. And regulators’
adoption of industry recommendations has long been the practice on the
OCS.144
CONCLUSION
In contrast to the responses to prior oil spills in the Santa Barbara
Channel and Prince William Sound, responses to the Macondo event in
the Gulf of Mexico have been more executive and regulatory than
legislative. The lack of major congressional action setting forth a new
legal framework for the OCS in response to the Macondo event may
indicate that little has changed.145 In some ways, it may make little
difference whether reforms are implemented via executive and
regulatory actions rather than legislatively. The MMS reorganization
proposed in the CLEAR Act was instead effected by the Secretary’s
executive order, with no real difference in the ultimate result.
Although enactment of major federal legislation in response to an
environmental disaster holds the possibility of fundamental change in the
regulatory structure, it is also vulnerable to a too-narrow focus on the
precipitating event. The failure of a legislature preoccupied with doublehulled tankers to implement SEMS-related reforms in OPA may be an

140. See API History, supra note 5.
141. See, e.g., Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78
Fed. Reg. at 20,424.
142. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 20,427. BSEE and COS will also oversee parallel, and somewhat overlapping,
regimes on the OCS. Weaver, supra note 90, at 412–13, 416, 420.
143. See JITF Report; see also Weaver, supra note 65, at 174.
144. See Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 225.
145. See Davis, supra note 42, at 173–74.
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example of such a vulnerability.146 Broad regulatory action might avoid
this pitfall, especially if it draws from multiple sources and is responsive
to a wider range of events. Because the SEMS regulations represent a
cumulative reaction to a series of OCS operations failures, they may be
less susceptible to the shortcomings of legislative reactions to a single
event. Moreover, although the API’s involvement in post-oil spill
regulatory responses is not new, the extent to which industry
participation is built into the SEMS regulatory processes appears to be
greater than in the past. The remaining question will be the extent to
which SEMS enables all stakeholders—regulators and industry
participants alike—to avoid or minimize offshore disasters.

146. See Nat’l Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 70.

